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IV 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDING BELOW 
This case involves an appeal of the trial court's holding (following a bifurcated 
four-day trial) that the Rawlings family farm is held for the benefit of the Rawlings 
family, and imposing a constructive trust upon Donald and Jeanette Rawlings. 
Appellate jurisdiction is present pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 54(b). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Marshaling the Evidence 
1. In making blanket assertions that 'no evidence' exists to support the trial court 
findings, and in failing to comprehensively present all the evidence that supports the trial 
court's ruling, and in failing to identify the 'fatal flaw' in the trial court's factual findings, 
Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence. See West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). Failure to marshal the evidence allows a 
court to dispose of the appeal on that issue alone. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ]{60, 28 
P.3d 1278. 
Constructive Trust 
2. The trial court was correct in imposing a constructive trust on Appellants 
Donald and Jeanette Rawlings when the evidence is that Donald represented to the family 
that he was holding the family farm for the benefit of the family, that all of the siblings 
reposed in Donald and Jeanette trust that they were acting for the benefit of the family, 
and when Donald and Jeanette made monetary disbursements to family members 
consistent with that understanding. Appellants argue in their statement of issues that the 
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standard of review for matters of equity is a 'clearly preponderates' standard, based on 
the case of In re Estate of Hock. In actuality, that holding in In re Estate of Hock has 
been overruled. The proper standard of review for matters both in equity and at law is a 
'clearly erroneous' standard. RHNCorp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f35, 96 P.3d. 935. 
Statute of Limitations 
3. The trial court was correct in finding that the discovery rule tolled the statute of 
limitations. As a matter of equity, evidence of facts sufficient to raise the discovery rule 
is a finding of fact that is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. In re Hoopiiaina 
Trust, 2006 UT 53,1J37, 44 P.3d 1129. 
Sanctions 
4. The trial court was correct in imposing sanctions on the Appellants Donald and 
Jeanette Rawlings when they failed to mediate in good faith. Sanction orders are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, ^[35, 71 P.3d 
601. 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-3 lb-5(2) 
The rules of the Judicial Council shall be based upon the 
purposes and provisions of this act. Any procedural and 
evidentiary rules as the Supreme Court may adopt shall not 
impinge on the constitutional rights of any parties. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-31b-5(3)(p) 
to authorize imposition of sanction for failure of counsel or 
parties to participate in good faith in the ADR procedure 
assigned; 
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UTAH RULES OF COURT-ANNEXED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, RULE 101(C) 
The mediation conference shall commence at the place, date, 
and time agreed upon by the mediator and the parties. All 
parties shall be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall 
have authority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case. 
The mediator shall conduct the mediation conference and 
determine the length and timing of sessions and recesses, and 
the order and manner of presentation of the issues. The 
mediation conference should proceed in a fashion that 
furthers the goals of the mediation process, preserves 
confidentiality, and encourages candor on the part of 
participating parties. The mediator should serve as a neutral 
facilitator, assisting the parties in defining and narrowing the 
issues and encouraging each party to examine the dispute 
from various perspectives, without undertaking to decide any 
issue, make findings of fact, or impose any agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The present case involves a dispute between siblings over the family farm, 
comprised of fruit orchards and livestock. In 1944, the father, Arnold Rawlings acquired 
the property in question from his mother. (See Trial Exhibit 3). Until 1967, Arnold had 
title to the property in his name. Id. The property has never been in the name of 
Arnold's wife, Cleo Rawlings. (See Trial Exhibit 3, Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 52:15-
16, 280:14-16). By October of 1966 Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer and 
required a substantial amount of medical care, including expensive cobalt treatments. 
(Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 45:20-25, 46:1-9, 47:5-13, 63:24-25, 64:1-23, 133:16-22). 
These expenses threatened to consume Arnold's estate, i.e. the farm. (Record 1451, 
Trans. Vol. I, 134:2-10). In order to avoid losing the farm, Arnold was advised by the 
welfare department to transfer the farm out of his name. (See Trial Exhibit 68). In 
March of 1967 Arnold disclosed to two of his sons, Dwayne Rawlings and LaRell 
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Rawlings, that he planned to transfer the farm to the eldest son, Donald Rawlings, to hold 
the farm for the benefit of Arnold and the family. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25, 
49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-24, 134:2-16, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 333:9-25, 
334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5). Donald was present at 
these discussions and indicated that he would follow the plan, and hold the farm for the 
family. Id. On March 24, 1967, the farm was transferred into Donald's name, along 
with that of his wife, Jeanette. (See Trial Exhibit 14). Although before the transfer, the 
farm was solely in Arnold's name, Arnold asked all of his children and their spouses to 
sign the 1967 deed. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:6-23, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 
247:2-10, 336:1-19). After the 1967 transfer, Arnold continued to work the farm and 
refer to it as "his" farm. (See Trial Exhibits 19-29, Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 
191:3-18, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 229:23-25, 233:21-25, 234:1, 238:9-12, 252:10-
23, 338:16-25, 339:1-22). LaRell continued to help his father market the fruit in 
Wyoming. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 99:2-25, 100:1-6). Prior to Arnold's death, 
Bryce Rawlings (the fourth son), moved into a trailer on the farm. (Record 1459, Trans. 
Vol. II, 248:6-20). Bryce continued to live there fore four to five years after Arnold's 
death. Id. After Arnold Rawlings died, on March 30, 1971 Cleo, Arnold's widow, paid 
the taxes on the farm. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 280:14-16). All of the siblings 
(except Donald ironically) continued to labor on the farm. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 
63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 238:9-12, 254:1-10, 
338:16-25, 339:1-22). In 1974, a boundary dispute with the development Vinyard 
Meadows arose on the southern border of the farm. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 104:9-
24, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 255:20-25, 256:1-16, 298:19-25, 299:1, 344:1-25, 345:1-
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25, 346:1-25, 347:1-21). Donald required his siblings and mother to sign an additional 
quit claim deed to clear up some purported fault in the title so that he could properly 
prosecute litigation against Vinyard Meadows on behalf of the family. Id. After 
successful litigation against Vinyard Meadows, Donald distributed proceeds from the 
judgment award to his siblings and his mother, thereby acknowledging his role of holding 
the farm for the benefit of the family. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 162:2-7, Record 
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 239:22-25, 240:1-17, 255:20-24, 290:21-25, 291:1-3, 351:1-25, 
352:1-19). In 1978, Donald and Jeanette, and Dwayne and Paulette, traded a small part 
of the farm ("the Pinegar lot") for another piece of land referred to as the 'industrial 
property.' (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 349:9-25, 350:12-22). Immediately before this 
trade, Donald and Jeanette also deeded, without consideration, a half interest in the 
Pinegar lot to Dwayne and Paulette Rawlings. Id. Donald and Dwayne operated a top 
soil business on the farm property, and reserved surplus profits for the benefit of the 
family. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 354:24-25, 355:1-6). Throughout the following 
years, the siblings continued to work the farm and give the proceeds of fruit sales to their 
mother, Cleo. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11, Record 
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 238:9-12, 254:1-10, 338:16-25, 339:1-22). Finally, in March of 
1993, Donald sold two lots off of the farm and purchased property located near St. 
George, Utah ("the Hellwell trade"). (See Trial Exhibit 48). The siblings had no notice 
of this trade until the late summer of 1993, but when they learned of it, they understood 
that Donald was still acting for the benefit of the family. (Record 1459., Trans. Vol. II, 
355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11, Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 453:7-25, 454:1-7). In late 
October or early November of 1993, Dwayne and Donald had a conversation in which 
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Donald indicated for the first time that he was holding the farm for himself and 
repudiated the trust. Id. The resulting disagreements over Donald's repudiation of the 
trust and disputes over the top soil business led to the disintegration of Donald and 
Dwayne's business and litigation ensued. Id. Three and a half years after the 
repudiation, Dwayne and his siblings filed a counterclaim against Donald, alleging 
constructive trust. (Record 23-38). After several pretrial motions and a lengthy 
discovery period, the trial court bifurcated the case. The initial part of the trial would 
address the issue of the existence of a constructive trust. The remaining causes of action 
between the parties, and the issue of damages on constructive trust, were reserved for the 
second part of the trial. On May 17, 2006, the District Court ordered mediation with 
Judge Burningham, in attempt to resolve the issues. (Record 1267). In mediation, 
Donald and Jeanette refused to consider the issues in the case, and refused to make any 
offers or consider any offers from the opposing parties. (Record 1295). Subsequently, 
the trial court imposed sanctions for failure to mediate in good faith. (Record 1403). The 
first half of the trial addressing the imposition of a constructive trust went forward on 
March 12 through March 15, 2007. (Record 1449-67). The District Court ruled on May 
24, 2007, imposing a constructive trust, and entered a Rule 54(b) certification on that 
issue. (Record 1540, 1583). Appellants seek review of the imposition of the constructive 
trust, and review of the imposition of sanctions for failure to mediate in good faith. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case presents several challenges to the trial court's findings of fact. The 
standard of review for all findings of fact, regardless of the burden of proof at the trial 
court level, is a clearly erroneous standard. Appellants' assertion that the standard of 
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review should be a 'clearly preponderates' standard is based on cases that are no longer 
good law. 
In challenging the existence of a confidential relationship, Appellants have failed 
to meet their burden of marshalling the evidence in the record to support the District 
Court's findings. That failure alone requires a ruling against the Appellants. The 
testimony and documentation strongly support the existence of a confidential 
relationship. Moreover, neither the trial court nor the Appellees limited themselves to a 
finding of a constructive trust based only on a confidential relationship. The existence of 
a confidential relationship is not required in order to properly impose a constructive trust, 
and the evidence properly supports the imposition of a constructive trust under alternate 
theories not raised in this appeal. 
Appellants also argue that the statute of limitations was not properly applied to the 
facts of this case, but in doing so Appellants have again failed to meet their burden of 
marshaling the evidence. In cases of constructive trusts between family members who 
repose trust in each other (which is the case here) the discovery rule exception to the 
statute of limitations presumptively applies. Once the discovery rule applies, the 
remaining question is whether and when did the beneficiaries of the trust have notice of 
repudiation. The uncontroverted evidence is that Appellees had notice of repudiation no 
sooner than the fall of 1993, well within any applicable statute of limitations. 
Finally, Utah rules and statutes permit a trial court to impose sanctions on parties 
that fail to mediate in good faith and the trial court properly found lack of good faith and 
appropriately imposed sanctions on Appellants. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ALL FINDINGS OF FACT, 
REGARDLESS OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF AT THE TRIAL 
COURT LEVEL, IS A "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS* STANDARD. 
Appellants Donald and Jeanette Rawlings (hereinafter "Donald and Jeanette") argue in 
their issues presented for review that when the burden of proof in the trial court is a clear 
and convincing evidence standard, then the standard of review for factual findings on 
appeal is a "clearly preponderates" standard. (See Appellants' Brief, pages 1-2). This 
legal principle and the supporting case law cited by Donald tad Jeanette have since been 
overturned and is no longer good law. Appellants' reliance on In re Estate of Hock is 
misplaced and erroneous. In RHN Corp. v. Veibell the Utah Supreme Court clarified that 
the standard of review for all factual findings is a "clearly erroneous" standard. 2004 UT 
60, f35, 96 P.3d 935. 
While it is settled that in cases at law, an appellate court will 
review a trial court's findings of fact under a clearly 
erroneous standard, in cases in equity, some confusion still 
exists over the proper standard of review for a trial court's 
findings of fact. In equity cases, appellate courts have often 
applied a clear preponderance standard. Nevertheless, there 
is also a recent trend in equity cases to review findings of fact 
under the clearly erroneous standard. . . . In the interests of 
simplicity, therefore, we hold that the proper standard of 
review for a trial court's findings of fact for cases in equity is 
the same as for cases at law, namely the clearly erroneous 
standard. 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); See also Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 
22, f23, 112 P.3d 495. "A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of 
the evidence or if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake 
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has been made." Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). This standard 
applies to all of the findings of fact on this appeal. Although some questions of law may 
be at issue, this appeal deals primarily with the factual findings of the trial court and the 
appropriate application of the law to these facts. In other words, this appeal is a case of 
questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law. In both circumstances, the 
appropriate standard of review is a clearly erroneous standard and not the 'clearly 
preponderates' standard proposed by Donald and Jeanette. The 'clearly preponderates5 
standard no longer has application in Utah. 
II. IN CHALLENGING THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL 
RELATIONSHIP, APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR 
BURDEN OF MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE, AND THERE IS 
ABUNDANT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS. 
A. Donald and Jeanette have not met their burden of marshaling the 
evidence. 
Under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "a party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." UTAH R. APP. P. 
24(a)(9). This requirement only applies to an appellant's challenges to "factual findings, 
not to conclusions of law." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corporation, 2004 UT 28, ]|37, 94 
P.3d 193 (quoting Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 1, \\1 n.4, 994 P.2d 193). This Court has 
clearly outlined a two-part burden placed on an appellant challenging findings of fact. 
First, 
[c]ounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to 
properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
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West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis 
added). Second, 
[a]fter constructing this magnificent array of supporting 
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting 
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Id. The appellant must show that the evidence when viewed "in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's ruling is insufficient to support the trial court's findings." State v. 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^60, 28 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, }^17 
n.2, 1 P.3d 1108) (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citations omitted). An 
appellant must demonstrate that the deficiency in the trial court's findings is "against the 
clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (internal quotation njiarks and citations omitted). 
It is insufficient, in meeting their burden, for an appellant to "merely re-argue the factual 
case they presented in the trial court." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f77, 100 P.3d 1177 
(internal citation omitted). 
An appellants failure to meet this burden "allows [the appellate court] to affirm the 
[trial] court's findings on that basis alone." Widdison, 2001 UT 60, [^60. It is not the 
duty of the Court of Appeals to "review the trial court's findings where the party 
challenging those facts fails to marshal the evidence." Eggett, 2004 UT 28, [^10 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, |24, 973 P.2d 431). 
Rather, upon an appellant's failure to marshal, the appellate court "must assume that the 
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record supports the findings of the trial court." Eggett, 2004 UT 28, f^lO (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Additionally, where an appellant asserts that there is no evidence in the record, the 
burden of marshaling the evidence will not shift to the appellee. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. 
Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 2002 UT 94, [^22, 54 P.3d 1177. In order to overcome a 
'no evidence' assertion, an appellee "need only point to a scintilla of credible evidence 
from the record that supports finding in order to overcome the appellant's 'no evidence' 
assertion and to demonstrate that the appellant has failed to meet its marshaling burden." 
Id. 
In the present case Donald and Jeanette have repeatedly asserted that there is no 
evidence to support the trial court's findings. Appellants have stated in their Brief that 
there was a "complete absence of. . . any evidence" of a confidential relationship. (See 
Brief of Appellants, page 8). Elsewhere, Donald and Jeanette assert that there was "no 
evidence offered . . . that they were in a confidential relationship." (See Brief of 
Appellants, page 9). 
Having asserted that there is 'no evidence' to support the trial court's ruling, 
Donald and Jeanette make no attempt to marshal the evidence which they allege does not 
exist. Although Appellees need only point to a 'scintilla' of evidence in support of a 
confidential relationship in order to overcome Donald and Jeanette's sweeping assertions, 
much more than a scintilla of evidence exists in the record. 
In the numerous findings of the trial court, Donald and Jeanette fail to designate or 
address those findings which they assert are insufficient. Moreover, they fail to marshal 
the evidence which supports these findings and they fail to raise the purported flaw 
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claimed to be fatal to these findings. In doing so, Donald ^nd Jeanette have cast on the 
Appellees and the Court the burden of searching the voluminous record to ascertain 
which findings they are challenging, and the evidence supporting them. In West Valley 
City this burden is explicitly imposed upon appellants. Donald and Jeanette have ignored 
their marshaling burden and this failure is fatal to their appea^. 
B. There is abundant evidence in the record to support the trial court's 
finding of a confidential relationship. 
A confidential relationship arises when one party gains the trust and confidence of 
the other and then exercises influence over that party. Estate of loupe, 878 P.2d 1168, 
1174 (Utah App. 1994). In order to find that a confidential relationship exists, a court 
must weigh a number of factors. Specifically, "[i]f by reason of kinship, business 
association, disparity in age, or physical or mental condition or other reason one party is 
in an especially intimate position with regard to the other, and the latter reposes a high 
degree of trust and confidence in the former, the court may find that the relationship is 
technically 'confidential.'" Hawkins v. Perry, 253 P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 1953) (internal 
punctuation and citation omitted). "While kinship may be a factor in determining the 
existence of a legally significant confidential relationship, there must be a showing, in 
addition to the kinship, a reposal of confidence by one partv and the resulting superiority 
and influence on the other party." Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Utah 
App. 1988) (citation omitted) rev'd on other grounds by Matter of Estate of Jones, 858 
P.2d 983 (Utah 1993); See also loupe, 878 P.2d at 1174. When it is shown that, 1) a 
party transferred certain property to another with the verbal understanding that the latter 
hold the property in trust for the benefit of the whole family, 2) that the transferor 
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reposed confidence in the transferee, and 3) that the transferor and the transferee were 
close relations, such as parent and child, then such evidence is sufficient to establish a 
confidential relationship. Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1949); Walker v. 
Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965). The existence of a confidential relationship is a 
question of fact. loupe, 878 P.2d at 1174; Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1978). 
In the present case there is substantial evidence that the parties are closely related 
by kinship, that Arnold transferred the farm to Donald and Jeanette with the 
understanding that they would hold the family farm for the benefit of the family, that the 
family reposed confidence in Donald and Jeanette that they would hold the family farm 
for the benefit of the family, and that Donald exercised influence over the family 
members. It must be remembered that Arnold Rawlings was suffering from cancer 
(eventually terminal) and was under heavy cobalt treatments. Consequently, he was 
under great stress to get the farm out of his name. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 45:20-25, 
46:1-9, 47:5-13, 63:24-25, 64:1-23, 133:16-22, 134:2-10). LaRell Rawlings, Donald's 
brother, testified that his father Arnold told LaRell that he wanted to get the farm out of 
his name so that he could qualify for government assistance due to his medical needs.1 
Id. Arnold initially wanted to put the farm in LaRell's name, since he was doing most of 
the work on the farm. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:11-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-3). 
LaRell suggested, instead, that Arnold put the farm in Dwayne's name, feeling that 
1
 Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer. Arnold was specifically instructed by the 
welfare department to transfer the farm out of his name so that he could qualify for 
benefits that would cover the costs of his medical treatment. (See Trial Exhibit 68). 
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Dwayne would be fairest to the family. Id. Arnold finally settled on Donald as the 
person who would hold the farm for the benefit of the family, he being the oldest son. 
(Record 1449, Trans. Vol. I, page 48, lines 20-25; page 49, lines 1-25; page 50, lines 1-
25; page 51, lines 1-24; page 177, lines 18-25; page 178, line 1). LaRell testified, 
"[W]hen I and my ex-wife Arlene went down to sign [the deed], Dad told me, he says 
'This is not Donald's property. This is the family's.' He told me that before I signed it. 
I didn't ask him that; he told me that." (Record 1449, Trahs. Vol. I, 60:8-12). LaRell 
further testified that his father and the rest of the family, including Donald, continued to 
treat the farm as family property, and to run the farm as a family farm, not as Donald's 
farm. (Record 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11). The 
understanding was that the proceeds from the farm would continue to benefit Arnold, 
Cleo (the mother) and the rest of the family. (Record 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 182:23-25, 
184:16-23, 191:3-18). LaRell testified: 
Q. At the time did you believe that Donald would do what 
your father told you was to be done with the farm? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. At that time you trusted that he would do that? 
A. Yes, I did. 
(Record 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 127:19-25, 128:1-3). 
Bryce Rawlings offered similar testimony to that of LaRell. He testified that 
Donald and Arnold approached Bryce, informed him that the farm needed to be taken out 
of Arnold's name, and that Donald would hold the farm for the benefit of the family. 
(Record 1451, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:4-8). In addition, the children continued to 
work the farm, and the farm continued to be treated as a family asset. (Record 1451, 
Trans. Vol. II, 229:23-25, 233:21-25, 234:1, 238:9-12, 248:6-20, 252:10-23, 254:1-10). 
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Proceeds from the farm went to Arnold and Cleo. Id. Bryce further indicated that 
Donald exercised influence over the family in that he managed the legal affairs of the 
farm and dealt with legal disputes. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. II, 255:20-25, 256:1-16, 
298:19-25, 299:1). The proceeds of these legal disputes were distributed to both siblings 
and parent, with the understanding that all of the family was entitled 1o the proceeds, 
because Donald was holding the farm in trust for the family. Id. Such distribution would 
not have been necessary if Donald had not been holding the farm for the benefit of the 
family. 
Dwayne Rawlings also offered evidence of a confidential relationship. He 
testified that Arnold and Donald approached him on the driveway of Arnold's house, and 
explained the medical situation and the need to get the farm out of Arnold's name. 
(Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:9-25, 334:1-10, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5. Arnold 
specifically told Dwayne, in the presence of Donald, "that they had to get it out of Dad's 
name, and they were going to put it in Donald's name to hold it for the rest of the 
family." (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:21-23). Arnold told Dwayne that the farm 
would be divided up between the family members at a later time. (Record 1459, Trans. 
Vol. II, 335:23-25, 336:1-2). Further, Donald exercised influence and deceit over the 
family in that, when managing a boundary dispute, he falsely represented to the family 
that additional deeds were required to perfect his title before he could proceed with 
litigation on behalf of the family. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 346:10-22, 352:9-19, 
398:3-7, Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 430:11-21). Throughout the years the family 
trusted Donald and followed his lead both in terms of legal issues and in finances. 
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(Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 396:11-25, Record 1461, Tran?. Vol. Ill, 420:10-20, 421:1-
20,430:11-21,462:3-13). 
Citing Jewell v. Horner, Donald and Jeanette assert that neither a confidential 
relationship nor a constructive trust can be established by oply 'self-serving' testimony. 
(See Appellants' Brief, page 10). While such argument m[ight have some merit if the 
only evidence supporting the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust were the self-
serving testimony of the siblings, the trial court had much more than sibling testimony on 
which to base its conclusions. There is ample evidence outside the testimony of 
interested parties which both substantiates and independently establishes propriety of 
imposing a constructive trust. Several letters and affidavits written three years after the 
transfer, both by Arnold, and by associates of his who were prominent in the community, 
substantiate the testimony. These letters were written after the transfer of the title of the 
farm to Donald, and yet, Arnold refers to the farm as "my farm" and repeatedly asserts 
and implies ownership and control. (See Trial Exhibits 19, 20). Arnold's associates do 
the same. (See Trial Exhibits 21-29). After Arnold's death, Cleo continued to pay the 
taxes on the farm, not Donald. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 280:14-16). 
Next, Donald sold a portion of the farm and purchased some commercial property 
from the proceeds of the sale upon which he and Dwayne operated a business. (Record 
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 349:9-25, 350:12-22, 354:24-25, 355:1-6). The brothers recognized 
that surplus proceeds of this business were to be held for thp benefit of the family. Id. 
The record shows that Donald deeded Dwayne a one half interest in a small portion of the 
farm (known as the Pinegar lot) which was subsequently traded for some commercial 
property to start a business. Donald deeded this half interest to Dwayne without 
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receiving or requiring any remuneration in return. Id. Such actions further substantiate 
that the farm and its derivatives were family assets, not Donald's assets. 
Furthermore, both Donald and Jeanette, against their own interest, failed to rebut 
any of the testimony given in support of a confidential relationship. Before trial Donald 
and Jeanette had asserted that they had paid off a small amount of back taxes and in 
return, Arnold had deeded them the entire farm. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:1-25, 
334:1-4). At trial, however, it was shown that Dwayne had paid the majority of these 
back taxes, and that he had done so on behalf of the family. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 
392:7-25). In addition, Donald did not rebut or dispute the testimony concerning his 
presence during both the conversation with Dwayne, Arnold and himself, and the 
conversation with LaRell, Arnold and himself. The uncontroverted testimony in regard 
to those conversations was that Donald indicated that he would hold the farm for the 
benefit of the family. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-24, 
52:21-25, 53:1-4, 60:8-12, 134:2-16, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:9-12, 
333:9-25, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5). Donald had 
ample opportunity to rebut this testimony, since he also was at the meetings, but he did 
not, thereby indicating that the testimony was truthful. Moreover, the uncontroverted 
evidence is that after settlement of the border dispute, Donald distributed some of the 
proceeds to the family, thereby indicating that he was holding for the benefit of the 
family. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 162:2-7, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 239:22-25, 
240:1-17, 255:20-24, 290:21-25, 291:1-3, 351:1-25, 352:1-19). In sum, there is much 
more evidence than just the testimony of all three siblings to substantiate the existence of 
a confidential relationship and the imposition of a constructive trust. 
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All of this evidence should make it clear that th^re was much more than a 
'scintilla' of evidence to support the trial court's finding of a confidential relationship. 
Furthermore, the abundance of evidence on this issue is definitive; the trial court's ruling 
was not clearly erroneous. 
It should be noted that the evidence cited here is not comprehensive, but merely a 
sample of the evidence presented to the trial court in support of a confidential relationship 
and a constructive trust. Appellees are not under the saine obligation as Donald and 
Jeanette are to marshal all of the evidence in favor of the ruling before articulating why 
the ruling was clearly erroneous. Appellees must merely show that a 'scintilla' of 
evidence exists to support the trial court's findings. 
It is also noteworthy that Donald and Jeanette have permanently lost the 
opportunity to marshal the evidence. They cannot try to marshal in a reply brief because 
that would not afford Appellees the opportunity to rebut. Coleman ex rel Schefski v. 
Stevens, 2000 UT 98, [^9, 17 P.3d 1122; See also Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 
2001UT75,31P.3d543. 
III. THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP IS NOT 
REQUIRED IN ORDER TO PROPERLY IMPOSE A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST. 
Donald and Jeanette argue that in the absence of the existence of a confidential 
relationship, no constructive trust can be imposed. (See Appellants' Brief, pages 8-9). 
This is legally incorrect. A court sitting in equity can impose a constructive trust when 
equity so demands; a court is not limited only to a confidential relationship theory. "A 
constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment in the absence of 
any express or any implied intention to form a trust." Tollman v. Winchester Hills Water 
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Company, Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 462 (Utah App. 1996); See also Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 
147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
[N]either § 44 of the Restatement of Trusts nor this Court's 
statement (above) in the Nielson decision constitutes an 
exclusive definition of constructive trusts and exhausts the 
possible circumstances under which a trust such as this may 
be imposed. . . . An attempt to define or describe a 
constructive trust would be inadequate because such 
definition or description would be too narrow in its scope and 
fail to include important types of constructive trusts. 
Parks v. Zion's First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah 1983) (interaal punctuation 
and citations omitted, emphasis added). 
Constructive trusts include all those instances in which a trust 
is raised by the doctrines of equity for the purpose of working 
out justice in the most efficient manner, where there is no 
intention of the parties to create such a relation, and in most 
cases contrary to the intention of the one holding the legal 
title, and where there is no express or implied, written or 
verbal declaration of the trust. 
Id. at 599 (emphasis added). Although the circumstances under which a constructive 
trust may arise are intentionally undefined, courts have given some guidance as to some 
circumstances that are seen more often than others. A constructive trust usually arises 
when one unjustly profits through fraud, or when there is a violation of a duty arising 
under a fiduciary or confidential relationship. Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 
710 (Utah 1977); Close v. Adams, 657 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Utah 1983). When the 
constructive trust is predicated on a fraud, there must be a nexus between the fraud and 
the property that is the target of the constructive trust. Lakeside Lumber Products, Inc. v. 
Evans, 2005 UT App 87,1J15, 110 P.3d 154. 
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In the present case, the Appellees have not exclusively relied upon a confidential 
relationship theory to support the constructive trust. The Appellees in this case have pled 
constructive trust and do not rely solely on one metho4 or theory for imposing a 
constructive trust. The facts, as presented at trial, easily support an imposition of a 
constructive trust under multiple other theories, including fraud, or a more general form 
of pure equity. 
Under the fraud question, evidence was presented at trial which showed that 
Donald specifically deceived his siblings in regard to the 1974 deed and the Vinyard 
Meadows litigation. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 104:9-24, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 
255:20-25, 256:1-16, 298:19-25, 299:1, 346:10-22, 350:12-22, 352:9-19, 352:24-25, 
353:1-12, 398:3-7, Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 430:11-21). That alone is sufficient to 
support a finding of constructive trust. The District Court stated that it considered 
the admitted treatment of the farm by Arnold as a family farm 
after the conveyance; the evidence of the welfare letter on 
December 16, 1966; the continued statements by Arnold; his 
solicitation of various letters from persons with whom he was 
acquainted nearly three years later; the affidavits by Arnold 
asserting that the farm was "his" farm and he needed help to 
run it, the payment of taxes by Dwayne after the conveyance 
to Donald; the payment of taxes in 1971 by Clep; the work on 
the farm by family members with irrigating, harvesting, and 
marketing fruit, as well as handling horses, with the proceeds 
of the harvest being given to their mother Cleo; the placement 
of a house trailer on the property by Bryce Rawlings prior to 
Arnold's death; the request that family members sign a quit-
claim deed to clear up a southern boundary dispute with the 
Vinyard Meadows subdivision; the payment by Donald of 
part of those proceeds to his siblings; the conveyance of a half 
interest in the Pinegar lot to Dwayne to purchase the 
industrial property; and the setting aside of fujids for Cleo's 
burial and the payment to her for the purchase of a car. . . . 
Such evidence as reviewed in the totality of the circumstances 
supports the imposition of a constructive trust. 
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(Record 1532-33). This evidence is sufficient to sustain a constructive trust on any 
number of theories, including a confidential relationship, fraud, or as a matter of pure 
equity. However, because the Donald and Jeanette have only challenged the imposition 
of a constructive trust under a confidential relationship theory, the imposition of a 
constructive trust under any other theory has not been raised on appeal. 
IV. IN CHALLENGING THE FINDING THAT THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED DUE TO A LACK OF REPUDIATION 
OF THE TRUST, APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR 
BURDEN OF MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE, AND THERE WAS 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
FINDINGS. 
A. Donald and Jeanette have again failed to meet their burden of 
marshaling the evidence. 
To reiterate, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state that "a party challenging 
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. With regard to the factual findings 
undergirding the statute of limitations findings, Donald and Jeanette were under the 
obligation to present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence and then ferret out some fatal flaw from this 'magnificent array' of evidence 
that is sufficient to undermine the trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 
1315. Merely re-arguing the factual case presented at trial is insufficient. Chen, 2004 
UT 82, *fll. In the case at bar, not only have Donald and Jeanette failed to marshal the 
evidence, they have even failed to reargue the factual case. Terse conclusory statements, 
devoid of evidentiary references, are all that is provided. This deficiency is because 
evidence is lacking. The Court will search the record in vain to find evidence which 
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adequately rebuts the trial court's findings that the statute of limitations was tolled until 
Appellees had notice of Donald and Jeanette's repudiation of the trust. Regardless of any 
purported deficiencies in the evidence, an appellant's failure to marshal the evidence 
"allows [the appellate court] to affirm the [trial] court's findings on that basis alone." 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ]f60. Upon an appellant's failure to marshal, the appellate court 
"must assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court." Eggett, 2004 UT 
28,110. 
In the present case, Donald and Jeanette have made iio attempts to marshal the 
evidence in favor of the trial court's findings. In addressing the statute of limitations 
issue, Donald and Jeanette immediately begin citing cases and presenting facts in support 
of their legal arguments regarding the statute of limitations. No attempt whatsoever is 
made to present facts supporting the trial court's findings. Appellants seem to rest such 
claimed error solely on the passage of time. Furthermore, Donald and Jeanette are barred 
from marshaling the evidence in their reply brief because that would not afford the 
Appellees an opportunity to respond. Coleman, 2000 UT 98, f9; Gildea, 2001 UT 75. 
Given Appellants complete failure to marshal the evidence oti ttie issue of the statute of 
limitations, the Court should affirm the trial court's findings oji that basis alone. 
B. The trial court found, based on substantial evidence, that the statute of 
limitations was tolled, due to Donald and Jeanette's lack of repudiation 
of the trust. 
Statute of limitations issues in constructive trust actions are complicated. Being a 
creature of equity, the constructive trust requires the trial court to consider all the 
evidence before it can rule on the issue. This is true for two reasons. First, the statute of 
limitations for a constructive trust is not defined by statute, thereby making it difficult to 
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determine which statute applies to the particular circumstance. Second, in constructive 
trust cases, and especially those involving family members, there is a presumption that 
the 'discovery rule' tolls the statute of limitations until discovery of repudiation of the 
trust. Answering these two questions requires factual findings, which generally have to 
be resolved at trial. The District Court directly acknowledged this issue at the outset of 
the case. (Record 259-260). 
As to the first issue, in the present case it may be argued that it is unclear whether 
the four-year catch-all provision found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 applies, or 
whether, because this case directly involves real estate, the seven-year real estate statute 
found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-6 applies. Fortunately, the uncontradicted evidence 
is that Donald and Jeanette first repudiated the trust (to Dwayne only) in early November 
of 1993. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11; Record 1461, 
Trans. Vol. Ill, 453:7-25, 454:1-7). Three and a half years later, Appellees filed their 
claim for constructive trust. (Record 24). Therefore, regardless of which statute of 
limitations applies, Appellees filed within the appropriate time period. 
As to the second issue, the discovery rule is an equitable doctrine which tolls the 
statute of limitations when a person lacks knowledge of the facts giving rise to a cause of 
action. 
While a statute of limitations generally begins running when a 
plaintiff has a completed cause of action, the discovery rule 
may nonetheless operate to toll a statute of limitations until 
the time at which a party discovered or reasonably should 
have discovered facts forming the basis for the cause of 
action. 
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In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, f 35, 144 P.3d 1129 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted); Christiansen v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, ^ 12, 136 P.3d 
1266. 
[T]here are two situations in which an equitable discovery 
rule will operate to toll a statute of limitatioris: (1) where a 
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action 
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading 
conduct, and (2) where the case presents exceptional 
circumstances and the application of the genepl rule would 
be irrational or unjust. 
Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, f 35 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the 
concealment prong of the discovery rale the claimant must demonstrate that "he neither 
discovered nor reasonably should have discovered the facts underlying the cause of 
action before the limitations period expired due to the defendant's concealment." Id. at 
1J36. When such a factual circumstance is established, the "statute of limitations will not 
commence running until the date the plaintiff possessed actual or constructive knowledge 
of the facts forming the basis of his or her cause of actipn." Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
Furthermore, in cases involving families and constructive trusts, the discovery rule 
presumptively applies. 
[W]hen a case involves a trust, a trustee cannot take 
advantage of a statute of limitations defense until something 
has occurred to give the beneficiary a "clear indication" that a 
breach or repudiation has occurred, or, alternatively, the 
circumstances must be such that the beneficiary must be 
charged with knowledge of such a repudiation or breach. 
Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, ^[11, 998 P.2d 262 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). A statute of limitations defense "is not available to a trustee as against his 
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beneficiaries until something has occurred to give a clear indication to them that he has 
repudiated his trust; or the circumstances are such that they must be charged with 
knowledge of such repudiation." Walker v. Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965); See 
also Snow, 2000 UT 20, ]fl 1. Although a court would normally conduct a balancing test 
to determine whether the discovery rule should apply, "[i]n the category of cases 
involving beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct, [a court has], in effect, already 
conducted this balancing test." Snow, 2000 UT 20, Tfl 1. 
Good public policy undergirds the presumptive application of the discovery rule to 
cases involving familial relations and constructive trusts. The case of Walker v. Walker is 
particularly on point. 404 P.2d 253 (Utah 1965). In Walker, the father of the family died 
much earlier than did the mother, leaving a substantial estate. Id. at 255. The estate was 
not probated and the mother continued to manage the affairs of the family assets, 
including a mercantile store and farm land. Id. When the family fell on hard times and 
family assets were jeopardized, the oldest son agreed to take title to the store and farm in 
order to avoid the loss of the property. Id. at 255-56. Mother and siblings continued to 
live in the house, work on the family farm, and run the family business for another thirty 
six years. Id. at 256. Finally, when the mother died, the eldest son repudiated his trust 
and declared that he considered the property to be exclusively his. Id. In addressing the 
issue of statute of limitations and laches, the court found that in such cases, the statute 
does not begin to run until the beneficiaries have actual or constructive notice of 
repudiation of the trust. Id. at 257. This was especially true because of the close familial 
relations involved. 
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Where a near relative is involved courts are less inclined to 
find a repudiation. This is so because of the greater 
likelihood that the beneficiaries have reposed confidence in 
him; and also, they would have a natural reluctance to sue 
him unless circumstances forced them to do so, . . . Under the 
facts shown there wouldn't be anything strange or 
unreasonable about the plaintiffs assuming, as they say they 
did, that the defendant was holding the property for the family 
until after the death of their mother, so that she would be 
provided with a home; and that after her death, their father's 
estate would be settled and each would receive his share. 
These considerations together with the fact that some 
members of the family remained in the property, make the 
refusal of the trial court to apply laches against the plaintiffs 
harmonize with reason. 
Id. (emphasis added); See also Acott v. Tornlinson, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 1959). More 
recently, the Utah Supreme Court clarified this doctrine in Snow v. Rudd. 2000 UT 20. 
[W]here a trustee is sued by a beneficiary or claims a 
violation of the trust, it constitutes an "exceptional 
circumstance" calling for application of the discovery rule. 
We have held that under certain "exceptional ctircumstances" 
we will find that a rigid application of the statute of 
limitations may be "irrational and unjust" and thus make the 
discovery rule available. To determine when this is the case, 
we apply a balancing test to weigh "the hardship imposed on 
the claimant by the application of the statute of limitations 
against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the 
passage of time." In the category of cases involving 
beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct, we have, in 
effect, already conducted this balancing test. In Acott and 
Walker we found, in substance, that to not apply the 
discovery rule would lead to unjust results because of the 
close familial relationship involved. In such a situation, the 
beneficiary will be less likely to question the motives of the 
trustee and less likely to sue. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
protect the interests of a beneficiary by applying the 
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the 
beneficiary knows or should know of the alleged breach or 
repudiation." 
Snow, 2000 UT 20, ^ [11 (internal quotation marks and citation^ omitted). 
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Early on in the instant case, while ruling on a motion for summary judgment based on 
a statute of limitations theory, the District Court correctly noted that this case presents an 
issue where the discovery rule might appropriately apply. (Record 259-260). Later, at 
trial, the District Court appropriately found that the case at bar does in fact present all the 
factual circumstances required to presumptively apply the discovery rule to toll the 
statute of limitations: the parties are siblings, and the evidence strongly demonstrates that 
both Arnold and each sibling reposed trust in Donald that he would hold the farm for the 
benefit of the family. (See Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-
24, 52:21-25, 53:1-4, 60:8-12, 127:19-25, 128:1-3, 184:16-23, 191:2-18; Record 1459, 
Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:4-8, 333:1-25, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 
388:20-25, 389:1-5, 396:11-25; Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 420:10-20, 421:1-20, 
430:11-21, 453:7-25, 454:1-7, 462:3-13; Trial Exhibits 19-29). Donald and Jeanette 
produced no evidence at trial that the parties were not siblings, and almost no evidence 
that the siblings did not repose trust in Donald and Jeanette. The District Court correctly 
sided with the great weight of the evidence. 
Because the discovery rule applies to the facts of this case, the only remaining 
question is whether and when repudiation occurred. In other words, when did the 
siblings know, or when should they have known that Donald and Jeanette were no longer 
going to honor their duties as trustees? When did Donald and Jeanette demonstrate that 
they would treat the family farm as solely their own property? In addressing this 
question, the District Court made the following factual finding: 
In 1993 Donald traded a property known as the Hellwell 
property, shown as Exhibit [4]1, for 6.5 acres in Washington 
County, Utah. It was only after Dwayne became aware of the 
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Hellwell trade that Donald or his spouse, for the first time, 
told any siblings they believed they owned the trust property, 
and they were using the funds or income from the trust 
property in any way they chose. 
(Record 1561). In other words, repudiation of the trust did not occur until after Dwayne 
knew of the Hellwell trade, and of Donald's intent on how he was planning to use the 
traded property. Substantial evidence supports this factual I finding. Dwayne Rawlings 
testified that he and the rest of the family learned of the Hellwell trade in the summer of 
1993, a few months after it occurred. (Record 1461, Trans. Vol. II, 453:7-25, 454:1-7). 
When the Hellwell trade was discovered by the siblings, it was generally understood that 
the trade was done for the benefit of the family. (Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill 453:7-25, 
454:1-7; Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11). It was not until late 
October or early November of 1993 that Dwayne finally learned of Donald's true 
intentions. Dwayne testified that in late October or early November of 1993, he and 
Donald had a conversation about the Hellwell trade. 
A. . . . I asked him what he'd give Mother for compensation 
for these two lots; and he told me he didn't give her anything. 
It was his lot. I says, "What have you - - how did you 
compensate Mother for the topsoil you've been taking off the 
farm?" He says, "I didn't compensate her at all. It was my 
property. It was my soil. I sold it, and put the money in my 
account, and spent it any way I wanted to." 
Then I said, "What about your brothers, your tliree brothers?" 
I said, "Why don't you - -" after he told Hie it was his 
property, I said, "Why don't you transfer a lot to each one of 
your two brothers and sister?" I said, "That would really help 
with the family relations." He said, "I'm not going to give 
that blank, blank, blank Larell anything." I saio, "What about 
Carol and Bryce?" "I'm not going to give them anything 
either." 
I finished up - - I told him at that time, I says, "I'll finish up 
the job I'm working on," and I was doing most of the work 
-28-
for the business. "I'll finish up the jobs I'm doing, and I will 
not do any more with you." 
Q. Was that the reason? 
A. That was the reason. 
Q. That caused the break up of your business? 
A. Yes. 
The District Court specifically found that this was "the first time" that Donald 
gave an indication to anyone that he would no longer hold for the benefit of the family, 
and repudiated the trust. Furthermore, LaRell Rawlings testified that he had no notice 
that Donald had begun to treat the family farm as his personal property until after this 
action was initially filed by Donald. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 177:18-25, 178:1). 
Three and a half years after Donald and Dwayne's conversation, on May 8, 1997, 
Dwayne and his siblings filed a counterclaim against Donald alleging constructive trust. 
(Record 23-28). Regardless of whether a four or a seven year statute of limitations 
applies, Appellees filed a claim for constructive trust within the appropriate time period. 
Interestingly, although both Donald and Jeanette took the stand at trial, neither 
testified as to the repudiation of the trust. The Hellwell property was not mentioned in 
their testimony; the 1993 conversation with Dwayne was not brought up. Donald and 
Jeanette made no efforts to rebut the evidence and testimony regarding repudiation of the 
trust. Naturally, the trial court followed the only evidence presented on repudiation, and 
correctly found that Donald initially repudiated the trust in the fall of 1993. Therefore, 
Appellees 1997 counterclaim for constructive trust was well within the statute of 
limitations. 
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V. UTAH RULES AND STATUTES PERMIT A TRIAL COURT TO 
IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON PARTIES THAT FAIL TO MEDIATE IN 
GOOD FAITH, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS IN THIS CASE. 
Contrary to Appellants' argument, the order imposing sanctions on Donald and 
Jeanette Rawlings is authorized by statute, and is consistent #ith Rule 101(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution. Rule 101(c) provides that a 
mediation conference "should proceed in a fashion that furthers the goals of the 
mediation process . . . and encourages candor on the part of participating parties." Rule 
outlined in the Alternative 
This statute states that "the 
101(c) derives its authority and is based upon the policies 
Dispute Resolution Act. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-5(l). 
rules of the Judicial Council shall be based upon the purposes and provisions of this 
[Alternative Dispute Resolution] act." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-5(2). Those 
provisions provide for sanctions in the absence of good faith. Specifically the statute 
authorizes the "imposition of sanctions for failure of counsel or parties to participate in 
good faith in the ADR procedure assigned." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-5(3)(p) 
(emphasis added). Pursuant to these rules and statutes, the District Court correctly noted 
that Rule 101(c) "requires good faith discussion, and whilej parties may terminate that 
process, they may only do so after they have engaged in thd settlement process in good 
faith." (Record 1405). 
Although the standard of review for imposing sanctions under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-3 lb-5 has never been addressed, the standard for review |br sanctions generally is an 
abuse of discretion standard. See generally, Hess v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 213, [^6 163 
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P.3d 747. However, Donald and Jeanette have not challenged the factual finding by the 
court that they failed to approach mediation in good faith, rather Donald and Jeanette 
have raised the sole issue of whether sanctions for lack of good faith are ever appropriate 
in a mediation setting. Therefore, what the standard of review should be for a District 
Court's factual finding of a lack of good faith under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 lb-5 is not 
properly before the Court. Donald and Jeanette have only raised the purely legal question 
of whether sanctions can be imposed on a party who fails to enter the mediation process 
in good faith. Because the finding of bad faith by the District Court has not been 
challenged, as long as UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3lb-5 requires parties to come in good 
faith, the imposition of sanctions was proper in this case. 
In the Order Granting Motion for Sanctions, for Payment of Mediator's Fees, and 
for Attorney's Fees of Opposing Counsel, the District Court imposed sanctions on 
Donald and Jeanette Rawlings after finding that they "came to the mediation with a fully 
formed intention not to participate in the mediation in good faith and had determined that 
they would not be prepared to discuss all relevant issues in this case." (Record 1401). 
Donald and Jeanette have attempted to characterize the District Court's rule as an 
imposition on the parties for failure to be "reasonable" and as a requirement that the 
parties take particular positions. While it may be true that a court cannot require parties 
in mediation to take a particular position, the District Court did not do this. The District 
Court only required that the parties be prepared to discuss all issues in good faith, 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-5(3)(p) and Rule 101(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution. The District Court determined that 
Donald and Jeanette did not approach mediation in good faith, and exercised its 
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marshaling the evidence. Because this case involves familial relations and constructive 
trust, the discovery rule exception to the statute of limitations presumptively applies. 
Because the discovery rule applies, the only remaining question was whether and when 
did the beneficiaries of the trust had notice of repudiation. The District Court properly 
found, based on uncontroverted evidence, that Donald initially gave notice of repudiation 
in the fall of 1993 in a conversation with Dwayne. Appellees brought a claim for 
constructive trust three and a half years later, well withiii any applicable statute of 
limitations. Therefore, Appellants arguments regarding the statute of limitations fail. 
Finally, Utah rules and statutes permit a trial court to impose sanctions on parties 
that fail to mediate in good faith. In the present case the trial court properly found a lack 
of good faith on the part of Donald and Jeanette, and appropriately used its discretion to 
impose sanctions on Appellants.
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discretion to impose sanctions, pursuant to the statute. No particular position was 
mentioned or required; no subjective "reasonableness" standard was applied. Therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 101(c) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3lb-5 the District Court properly 
imposed sanctions based on Appellants lack of good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
The standard of review for all findings of fact, regardless of the burden of proof at 
the trial court level, is a clearly erroneous standard. The 'clearly preponderates' standard 
is based on cases that are no longer good law and the standard is no longer applicable in 
Utah. Although Appellant's have challenged the trial court's findings of a confidential 
relationship, Appellants have failed to meet their burden of marshalling the evidence in 
the record to support the District Court's findings. That failure alone is sufficient to rule 
against the Appellants. Moreover, independent documentation indicates that after the 
1967 transfer of the family farm to Donald and Jeanette, Arnold continued to work the 
farm and refer to it as his own property. After his death, the family continued to work the 
farm and treat it as a family asset. The family reposed trust in Donald and Jeanette and it 
was understood that he was holding the farm for the benefit of the family. The trial court 
properly imposed a constructive trust. Moreover, neither the trial court nor the 
Appellees limited themselves to a finding of a constructive trust based only on a 
confidential relationship. The existence of a confidential relationship is not required in 
order to properly impose a constructive trust, and the evidence properly supports the 
imposition of a constructive trust under alternate theories not raised in this appeal. 
Appellants also argue that the statute of limitations was not properly applied to the facts 
of this case, but in doing so Appellants have again failed to meet their burden of 
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